Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications (CESifo Seminar Series) by Gerhard Illing, Ulrich Klüh

Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications (CESifo Seminar Series) Author: Gerhard Illing, Ulrich Klüh
eBook Title: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications (CESifo Seminar Series)
ISBN10: 0262090376
ISBN13: 978-0262090377
Language: English
Publisher: The MIT Press (December 23, 2003)
Category: Business & Money
Subcategory: Management & Leadership
Size ePub vers.: 1460 kb
Size PDF vers.: 1787 kb
Other formats: cb7, odf, pdf, azw, ibooks, mobi
Rating: 4.1
Votes: 267

Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience.

In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.